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SUMMARY 
Increasing food production in Africa through augmentation of the area of 
cultivated land is becoming less feasible thus emphasizing the need for 
increasing the productivity of the existing area to meet the objectives of 
national ,food security programmes. Several factors, however, negate the 
achievement of thisgoal. Thispaperfocuses on the eight countries of the West 
African Sahel and discusses the implication of the lack of a critical mass of 
indigenous scientists in national programmes for conducting adaptive 
research on existing technologies or generating new ones for the particular 
situations of the region. The problems associated with these programmes are 
presented in the light of the number and calibre of personnel in agricultural 
research, the place of agriculture in national development, and the impact of 
,foreign technical assistance. Measuresfor improving the domestic capacity of 
national programmes especially as they relate to training, are discussed. 
Regionalisation and networking programmes are also suggested as possible 
alternatives. 
BACKGROUND 
One of the components of any national strategy to ensure food security is to 
increase food production. Records show that in Africa for the period 
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1960-79, there was a modest increase in total food production.‘* The low- 
income semi-arid countries of West Africa, otherwise referred to as the 
Sahel, registered 1.1 per cent average annual growth rate of total volume of 
production for the period, 1969-79. However, the average annual growth of 
total production per capita for the same period was - 1.2 per cent, indicating 
an actual decline in productivity. Thus, the increased volume in production 
was a result of an increase in area cultivated. 
Either claims that 25 years after independence, Africa is importing food, 
while vast tracts of land lie idle and foreign assistance is at record levels.4 
Past models of African agricultural development have also tended to assume 
a generalized land surplus situation. 6*g But there is substantial evidence that 
the land base and changing land use patterns lead to quite different 
conclusions.8,“*‘3 A number of factors contribute to this body of evidence, 
such as: non-suitability for agriculture due to increasing desertification; 
presence of ferrogenous hard pans; frequent flooding; a high degree of 
micro-variability in land quality; and the rapid decline of soil fertility under 
continuous cultivation. Combined with these factors is a rapid population 
growth rate that contributes to the pressure on the land so that by the end of 
this century in most of Africa there will be few regions where agricultural 
production can be increased by expanding the area under cultivation. The 
implication of this statement is that increased agricultural production must 
be generated by increased land productivity. Increased land productivity in 
turn implies either the use of existing technologies, directly or through 
adaptation, or the generation of new technologies to bring about not only 
increased productivity but also for the maintenance of that productivity. 
The scientific ability of African nations to generate this change through 
the use of existing technologies or the generation of new ones is highly 
questionable-and justifiably so. Spencer argues that even if internal 
policies had been correct or external economic factors favourable, the 
situation would not have been so bad, since research has not produced a 
large enough stock of technologies to assure a big increase in aggregate 
agricultural output, particularly food ~upply.‘~ But the issue is: why does 
this lack exist, and why is there a lack of a strong indigenous scientific 
community capable of transforming or generating appropriate tech- 
nologies? Sub-Saharan Africa has not been able to adapt existing 
technologies or to generate new ones for its particular situations, partly 
because resources are scarce and their management make it impossible to 
fund a research effort on every commodity in every country. The region also 
lacks the ‘critical mass’ of indigenous scientists necessary to produce 
knowledge through basic and applied research. 
Hayami and Ruttam classified technology transfer into three inter-related 
stages, namely: (1) material, (2) design, and (3) capacity transfer.7 Whichever 
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way we look at it, both material transfer and design transfer are dependent 
upon the forum of capacity transfer. The movement of an item from point A 
to point B does not mean it has been transferred. Transferability needs to be 
defined in terms of its ultimate useability. In Africa, local adaptive research 
is needed to make use of transferred material together with training that will 
enable indigenous scientists to use the designs, blueprints, books etc., to 
conduct adaptive research. The issue then, for Africa, is lack of an adequate 
human capacity or the absence of a critical mass of sufficiently trained 
indigenous scientists to bring about this change and maintain it long enough 
to have an impact. 
The reality of these concerns for the Sahel and for Africa as a whole can be 
expressed in terms of the need for food security. Food security means 
increased and stable food production at affordable prices. This can be 
generated through increased inputs. The vital component of this is 
knowledge, and this knowledge must reside within a critical mass of the 
indigenous manpower sector. In the words of Ruttan ‘. . . only a country that 
establishes its own research capacity in agriculture can gain access to the 
advances in knowledge that are available to it from the global scientific 
community, and embody that knowledge in the technology suited to its own 
resource and cultural endowments’.’ s Agricultural research in the West 
African Sahel suffers from problems that are common in several African 
countries: old infrastructures, poor maintenance, non-functional equip- 
ment, lack of government support, insufficient operating budget, and 
inadequate personnel. 
PERSONNEL IN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
Agricultural research stations in the Sahel are manned by both national and 
expatriate staff of varying calibre. In 1983 there were more than 600 research 
professionals in the eight Sahelian countries*, and nearly one-third were 
expatriates.3 Although the remaining 400 African nationals may encourage 
an impressive view of the manpower situation, it must be recognized that 
about 200 of these national scientists were in Senegal and the other 200 were 
distributed in seven different countries with a total population of 20 million 
people. Very few of these national scientists and researchers have any 
training beyond the Ingenieur Agronome Diploma. For example, in Niger, 
out of an estimated 200 researchers in 1985 only 20 percent had the Doctorat 
de troisieme cycle or above (Fournier, pers. comm.) and of these, more than 
half were expatriates, thus implying that less than 17 nationals in Niger’s 
* Burkina Faso, Chad, Cape Verde Islands, The Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and 
Senegal. 
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agricultural research had post-graduate degrees. In Mali, out of 347 people 
involved in agricultural research in 1985 only 15 had the equivalent of an 
MSc or higher degree. 
In the case of Senegal, the national agricultural research department had 
267 scientists in 1983. This number was spread over eleven institutions. The 
Institut Senegalais de Recherche Agronomique (ISRA) alone has ten centres 
or research stations staffed by 174 professionals of which only 126 are 
nationals. These professionals are charged with the enormous responsibility 
of conducting research on animals (cattle, sheep, horse breeding), crops 
(millet, rice, sorghum, groundnuts, and vegetables) forestry and fisheries and 
also in the various disciplines.3 
PLACE OF AGRICULTURE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Both recipient governments and several donor agencies have a biased view 
of the role of agriculture in national development. They fail to see the value 
of reliable surpluses in agricultural production as a precondition for the 
development and expansion of the industrial sector. This attitude is 
translated into the weak support that is given to agricultural research. The 
performance of any research unit depends on the financial support it 
receives. In 1980, Mali, Senegal, and Burkina Faso ody spent an average of 
O-91 per cent of their agricultural gross national product (GNP) on research. 
In 1983, the Government of Mali allocated $1.25 million to the Institut 
d’Economie Rurale (only 40 per cent of their budget) to pay salaries of 715 
local staff as well as to fund operational activities and meet recurrent costs. 
Burkina Faso allocated less than $1 million (actually only $715 000) in 1983 
to the Institut Burkinabe de Recherche Agronomique et Zootechnique. The 
Senegalese government did not set up a university level faculty to teach 
agriculture to undergraduates until 1979 (19 years after independence) 
although it was producing graduates for the civil service, industrial, and 
urban sectors.4 
The irony of the situation is that while leaders would have us believe that 
they emphasize agriculture as the ‘priority of priorities’, and encourage their 
farmers to produce more food, this lip service is nothing less than expecting a 
miracle to occur. In the Sahel, this miracle is rainfall. Few Sahelians are 
convinced that it is not just the erratic rainfall that is responsible for the 
decline in food production. The reality of the situation is clearly expressed in 
the words of Edmund0 Flores, ‘development may take place in a democracy 
or a dictatorship, under capitalism, socialism, or communism. But it cannot 
occur without a critical mass of specialists in science and technology. The 
political decision to develop science and technology requires shifting a 
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considerable share of the government’s expenditure to education and 
research over a long period’.5 
But one must hurry to sympathise with the economic situation in these 
countries. In most cases the external trade balance records astronomical 
deficit levels on an annual basis and the purchasing power has decreased 
significantly today from what it was 25years ago at independence. Most 
African countries today devote a significant proportion of their total export 
earnings to debt service; and yet in other cases, the decline in export earnings 
does not encourage investment in the research sector where a quick-fix 
solution to the national economic problem is unavailable. 
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE-FOOD AID 
The amount of foreign assistance to Africa today is astonishing. One form of 
this assistance-food aid-while serving a genuine purpose in the face of 
disasters and catastrophes, does ensure the continuity of the dependency 
syndrome. Food aid should be viewed as a temporary measure to tide people 
over, to transport the infirm across a bridge in time. But food aid in the Sahel 
has come to stay-as an annual exercise. Governments are unable to 
pronounce budget figures until foreign contributions are firmly obligated. 
And food aid has deleterious effects: (1) it is a disincentive to produce; (2) it is 
dehumanizing and subservient; (3) it influences food tastes and preferences; 
and (4) it upsets national priorities. 
Donors have responded to Africa’s economic crises by increasing the 
official development assistance (ODA) from 25 per cent in 1975 to 30.6 per 
cent in 1983 of total ODA.” In several Sahelian states, the level was 
substantially higher than anywhere else in the world: Mali-$27.9 per 
person, Burkina Faso-$35.6, Gambia-$59.5, Niger-$33.1 and Senegal- 
$56.2. While it is wholesome that the strong assist the weak, often the 
response of donor agencies to the cry for assistance in almost all sectors has 
been too frenzied. There has been little in-depth analysis and this has been 
followed by hastily designed projects. These are implemented with little or 
no understanding of the itinerant, or constantly recurring problems by a 
flood of overnight consultants extrapolating incoherent strategies. This 
process too often upsets an already fractured system and creates a mass of 
intractable splinters. 
Two good examples come from the food production project in the 
Cassamance in Senegal, and the rainfed farming in the Dosso project in 
Niger. Both were complete failures. In the latter case the project was 
hurriedly terminated due to inadequate design and monitoring.” Another 
example is the USAID/Institut du Sahel’s Integrated Pest Management 
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Project. From its inception, it was doomed to fail. Without basic knowledge 
of the major pest species, their biology and distribution, economic 
importance, threshold levels, or crop loss figures, results were expected in 
less than five years. These results were to change the Sahelian farmers’ 
production levels of five crops: sorghum, millet, cowpeas, maize, and rice. 
This project has now been terminated for obvious reasons: poor knowledge 
of the problem, over-ambitious objectives, poor planning, interstate 
politicing, and unqualified field ‘experts’. 
Donors have responded differently to Africa’s crises, depending on the 
sector involved. Dramatic food crises send donors vying for first place in 
tonnage of food aid. But how have they responded to needed human capital 
development? The World Bank committed $105 million to strengthen 
Senegal’s national agricultural research for the period 1981-88. What 
happens after 1988? The INTSORMIL programme was officially es- 
tablished on 1 July 1979. But as of 30 June 1984 only four Sahelians had 
participated in INTSORMIL-sponsored training in US universities.” Yet, 
across the subregion, there is a consistent succession of expatriate 
technicians, consultants and advisers ‘ensuring’ that the collective 
knowledge accumulated is appropriated by the same agencies involved. This 
explains in part why some of the results of research are often inaccessible to 
scholars in Africa because they are to be found only in depositories in 
London, Paris, Bonn, Washington and Rome. The dichotomy leaves one 
wondering how genuine the advanced nations of the world are in their 
committment to bring the African peoples to the doorstep of food security. 
The arguments presented so far indicate that there is an acute weakness in 
the resource base of indigenous professional personnel; governments do not 
accord sufficient support to research; food aid has deleterious effects; and 
foreign technical assistance is sometimes poorly administered. These factors 
all combine into another deleterious effect: they cripple the resource base. 
The number of foreign assistance efforts in any particular country is often 
beyond the management capabilities of national systems. For example, in 
1984, the USAID had approximately 1000 active projects in 35 countries in 
Africa.4 In Mali alone, in 1985 there were eight active and overlapping 
USAID-financed agricultural research and extension projects. Moreover, 
few projects have life-spans longer than 2-5 years and several are terminated 
even while still on the drawing board. 
Fortunately, donors are beginning to realize the need for long-term 
commitments. But while the International Agricultural Research Centres 
(IARCs) are good indicators of this shift in policy, very few national 
programmes have received similar commitments. Donors and agencies 
support components of national projects and often co-sponsor support to 
various national, regional, and international research and development 
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institutions. In Niger, plant protection research and extension is covered by: 
(1) the National Plant Protection Service of the Ministry of Rural 
Development; (2) the Plant Protection Division of the Institut National 
de Recherches Agronomiques du Niger (INRAN) under the Ministry 
of Agriculture; (3) USAID Niger Cereals project; (4) the German 
Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) project; (5) the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) project; and (6) the 
regional USAID/Institut du Sahel IPM project. These projects are not 
integrated under one national co-ordinating body. Such an influx and 
multiplicity of projects stretches the absorptive capacity of the system, 
weakens the degree of concentration on commodity research, and disrupts 
focus and priority. This flood of assistance affects the quality of research and 
results in observational rather than investigative and analytical research. It 
systematically inhibits the existence in any one place of a strong scientific 
community. It also limits the perceptive horizon of the individual-the 
ability to conceptualize, formulate, prioritize, and execute-and creates an 
unhealthy research environment. The need for nationals to provide the 
management and administration to service the myriad of donor projects 
further weakens the capacity of the national system. As a result, some 
researchers become administrators and project directors, others become 
disillusioned and complacent and field technicians are left without the 
necessary technical leadership. 
WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE 
As agricultural scientists concerned with international development, there is 
little we can do to change government policies and attitudes (such as fiscal 
and pricing policies and marketing systems) nor can we interfere with food 
aid and the politics that accompany it. Governments will come and go, and 
so will various food aid programmes, but the people whose lives are affected 
will remain. These are the ones that constitute our major asset. We must 
upgrade the value of our assets, for the more its worth is enhanced, the 
higher the returns that can be expected from it. 
Training 
The facilities available in Sahelian countries for agricultural training are not 
geared towards producing competent professional scientific leadership. Out 
of 28 agricultural institutions in four countries (Burkina Faso-5, Mali-5, 
Niger4 and Senegal-14) none offers training to MSc or PhD levels.3 
Consequently, graduate studies are pursued abroad. Since few African 
governments can meet the cost of overseas graduate studies, support for 
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such training relies on foreign assistance. But donor agencies do not often 
make the most effective possible contribution to the manpower needs of the 
nation for development, and too often the training offered is geared towards 
advancing donor mandates or 0bjectives.l As a result, training may not 
accord with, and may even distort, the priorities that are needed for national 
development. Our training programmes as they are today emphasize 
commodity and disciplinary research. But most of our students end up as 
policy and decision makers. This may not in itself be a bad thing, particularly 
in cases where present-day policy makers dealing with the agricultural sector 
have limited or no training in the agricultural sciences. But these 
programmes should also reflect mechanisms for the training of policy 
scientists. They should evolve a methodology that enhances a flow, a 
continuum of relationship between commodity research, cropping systems, 
farming systems, and the agricultural sector, all within the framework of 
overall national development. 
What this implies is that we should, we must, broaden our resource base 
through massive human capital investment. Overseas training of our 
professionals will continue to be needed for the next 25 years; but, training 
requiring field research at the post-graduate level that is related to 
agriculture should be done in West Africa. 
The International Agricultural Research Centres (IARCs) in Africa 
should expand their training programmes to encourage national scientists 
(whether with PhDs or not) to participate in 6-24 months in-service 
professional enhancement. In some cases this may require special 
arrangements outside existing centre programme policies, for example, by 
modifying the prerequisites for interns and visiting scientists. The Centres 
have a major role to play in the training of young African scientists and this 
role must be viewed on a long-term basis. The IARCs should be viewed as 
centres of excellence and inspiration to their national counterparts rather 
than as competitive elements-a misconception that is not uncommon on 
both sides. 
The ability to borrow and adapt technology to local conditions does not 
reside solely in the acquisition of an MSc or PhD. We take it for granted that 
newly trained and qualified personnel are effective and productive on ‘day 
one’. There is at least a ten-year period between the commencement of 
graduate training and the productive years of the individual: five years of 
graduate studies, and five more of gestation and moulding during which an 
adaptive conceptualization and mind development occurs. Thereafter the 
ability to generate and deliver the goods takes place. 
The drain of trained technical personnel into the administrative sector is 
only too apparent because their number is limited. This ‘brain drain’ will 
continue until both donors/agencies and recipient nations work in consort 
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to identify manpower needs as well as articulating what kinds of training are 
available. Otherwise, faced with the general shortage of professional 
manpower, governments will continue to accept what they can get-in the 
hope of distributing the end product into their own priority areas. 
Leadership 
The great strides in development achieved in the advanced nations have not 
come about through the simple aggregate effort of the masses. Rather, this 
aggregate effort was invariably stimulated by the few who had a fuller 
understanding of development processes, and the place of knowledge in 
development-the few who drew knowledge from their experiences, both 
successful and unsuccessful, to design programmes and options appropriate 
not only for a single sector of the society, but that cut across the 
developmental needs of their nations. 
There is sufficient evidence to justify the claim that most African countries 
need strong and reliable leadership at all levels of their societies-the 
Sahelian countries are no exception. Leaders are needed who are committed 
to the well-being of their peoples; national institute directors who know that 
knowledge is the key to freedom of the spirit, and freedom from hunger. 
Leaders who do not obstruct progress are needed; people not complexed by 
the training of the upcoming generation for fear that their mantle of power 
will be wrested from them. 
Regionalization 
Studies have shown that many, small, lesser-developed countries will not be 
able to increase their investment in agricultural research to the levels 
necessary to assemble a critical mass of researchers. Without this investment 
they will be unable to foster programmes to enable them to adapt 
development in agricultural sciences and technology to their local needs. 
Similar conclusions, in summary, by directors of the International 
Agricultural Research Centres were that ‘there are simply too many small 
African countries with inadequate financial institutional and human 
resources to mount independent agricultural research programme?.’ 9 They 
recommended that ‘the most efficient approach for Africa may be to develop 
complementary centres of excellence in the various countries which taken 
together, would constitute a strong, well-rounded agricultural research 
system region-wide’. 
There are proven examples of successful regional programmes in South 
America, Asia and southern Africa. Regionalization and/or networking 
reduces costs, minimizes duplication, boosts efficiency, and favours the 
much-needed existence of a critical mass of professionals working in the 
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same location or project. Plucknett and Smithi enumerated seven basic 
principles for success in networking: problem definition, commonality of 
problem, self-interest, commitment of resources, funding, manpower and 
expertise, and leadership. Given the situation in the Sahel, regionalization 
and networking should receive wide support. But examples of the West 
African Rice Development Association (WARDA) and the Institut du 
Sahel’s Integrated Pest Management Project should serve as pointers. In 
fact, it is known that there is little political support among Sahelian states for 
regional development activities.2 
CONCLUSION 
Constraints that hinder the effectiveness of national research institutions are 
far more extensive than have been discussed in this paper. Some of these lie 
in the domain of complex political organizations within national systems. 
The political will of nations, the moral obligations of societies, the merit 
system and mechanisms of compensation for excellence are areas that need 
to change from within. Just as technology cannot be imposed, and national 
development cannot be brought about by external introductions, so must 
the willpower of a people generate their own internal transformations. These 
are issues that transcend researchers, who represent but one group of people 
working to improve the plight of their country. 
Donors and agencies genuinely concerned with the African food crises 
must re-orientate their strategies and priorities. Far more could be achieved 
if at least half of the present projects were phased out and funds pooled into 
fewer projects. Such an action would extend the‘kfespan of remaining 
projects, encourage continuity both in the expatriate personnel and national 
programme staff, and hold the promise of more meaningful, substantive 
accomplishment. 
Donor agencies need to reassess their objectives and should demand 
accountability from recipient countries. A multiplicity of projects, the 
incoherence of some projects and objectives, and the seeming indifference of 
some donor agencies in continued assistance to obvious failures have largely 
contributed to the often-heard phrase-‘It is AID money’. The most 
successful projects so far have been those with marginal but assured long- 
term funding, small- to medium-scale, with clear objectives, and people- 
oriented; not the highly visible, multi-million dollar government-oriented 
ones. 
It is high time that both donor agencies and recipient governments 
realized that developmental processes can only be generated from within 
and cannot be introduced, let alone imposed upon a people. Donors should 
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insist on counterpart participation both in financial and human resources, 
no matter how meagre this may be. But at least, an indication of willingness 
to bring about the necessary changes from within should be a prerequisite. 
A people must evolve and, through a natural process of maturity, come to 
a realization and an appreciation of their needs. The opportunity must be 
given for them to grow and develop, if such development is to be an integral 
part of their cultural evolution. Unless leaders (helped through provision of 
the necessary educational experiences) emerge from within their own ranks 
to navigate their course, efforts at developmental assistance will continue to 
falter. 
While regional projects may warrant priority over a multiplicity of 
national projects, a precondition remains for the existence of adequate 
manpower and expertise. Importation of expatriate staff alone will fall sadly 
short of bringing about changes in national programmes, in regional 
projects, and network programmes. The bottom line of the problem is the 
urgent need to train a massive contingent of national researchers. This does 
not imply that all national staff should be trained to MSc and PhD levels. On 
the contrary, the need is just as urgent for para-professional types of training 
and BSc-level training. Several countries in the Sahel have facilities for 
training of this sort. Putting them into adequate and efficient use is a moral 
obligation. Unless national institutions are mandated to cater to national 
needs, Africa’s development prospects will remain disappointing. In 
summary, the following three mutually inter-active approaches may be 
envisaged: 
(1) Strengthening the research institutions through infusion with a 
critical mass of well-trained, capable, indigenous scientists, i.e., a 
long-term investment in human capital development; 
(2) strengthening the national capacity to train its own scientists, 
technical, and para-professional staff at all levels of the research 
institution; and 
(3) strengthening the country’s capabilities to make productive use of its 
scarce scientific resources through redesign of the research 
institution: objectives, orientation and approach. 
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